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INTRODUCTION
Vertical coordination — where the payment of the market price for a good or service is replaced
by (I) internal development within the firm, (2) acquisition, (3) merger, or (4) some type of formal (or
informal) contract -- has been an economic concern dating back at least to Adam Smith's (1776) The
Wealth of Nations . The conversation on vertical coordination (or the more prosaic "make or buy"
decision) by (agricultural) economists, accountants, procurement specialists and marketing and
management strategists has been extensive since the turn of the 20th century'. Surely there must be some
pearls of insight contained in this massive literature that can be of use to practitioners in the field of
agriculture (and elsewhere). Indeed, important ideas on vertical coordination have been expressed by a
diversity of individuals ranging from Nobel prize winners in economics (e.g., Kenneth Arrow, Ronald
Coase, Douglass North and George Stigler) to the multitude of practitioners where "make or buy"
decisions are their livelihood.
Oscar Wilde once noted that: "Truth is rarely pure and never simple." In truth, vertical
coordination problems are rarely pure and never simple. This paper attempts to present vertical
coordination problems in a comprehensible and efficient manner while remaining faithful to the
complexities involved.
General theme . Before providing details on the vertical coordination problem we consider the
general outline for vertical coordination in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In order to avoid endless confusion on the vertical coordination problem it
is essential that the manager separate two distinct issues:
Issue #1: What is the objective for vertical coordination? Or put differently,
what efficiencies, risk-sharing, or market power advantages are being sought?
' There have been well over 600 published works on vertical coordination in economics, marketing,
and management journals. A complete list of these works is available from the authors upon request.
Issue #2: Given a compelling objective for vertical coordination in issue #1
above, the critical question concerns what organizational form (e.g., vertical
contracts or vertical mergers & acquisitions) best achieves the desired
objective.
Section 1 considers the various objectives for vertical coordination that may provide efficiency,
risk-sharing, or market power advantages. Section 2 discusses the various types of vertical contracts to
achieve vertical coordination objectives. Section 3 considers the advantages and disadvantages of vertical
financial ownership. Section 4 discusses the critical dimensions of vertical coordination that managers
should consider in the choice of organizational form (e.g., vertical contracts versus vertical financial
ownership). Section 5 provides conclusions.
Section 1 : Vertical Coordination Objectives
The traditional vertical market channel in the agricultural and food marketing system starts with
the farm and goes to the manufacturer (first handler), who may be a processor, packing house/elevator,
broker, or manufacturer, and then goes to the wholesaler or retailer (Kilmer, 1986). Recent changes in
demand and supply conditions have triggered changes in vertical coordination. This section restricts
discussion to motives for why we observe (and have observed) vertical coordination both in agriculture
and in other sectors in the United States economy-.
A careful study of history and theoretical contributions reveal an embarrassment of riches of
possible objectives for vertical coordination. Twenty-six objectives are discussed in this section.
1. A fundamental objective for vertical merger has been the managers' "search for synergy". That is,
on the demand side it makes sense to sell certain items together (e.g., hammers and nails at a hardware
store). On the supply side there are often technological complementarities or what economists call
"economies of scope " (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982). For example, in bringing together processes
in the manufacture of iron and steel, thermal economies from the shareable input of the blast furnace are
achieved. Thus, the cost of producing iron and steel together is less than the sum of producing iron and
steel in separate blast furnaces. Similarly, the cost of producing wool and mutton together is less than
the cost of producing wool and mutton separately.
^ Alfred D. Chandler (1977) provides the most comprehensive overview of the history of vertical
integration in the United States.
2. Relatedly, vertical coordination of an input with multiple end products may be motivated by the desire
to achieve economies of scale in the production of the input. For example, economies in corn wet
milling processing can be achieved by making high fructose corn syrup and ethanol from the yielded corn
sugars.
3. A third objective that surely most managers (and academics) can relate to is Plato's observation that
"knowledge is power". If a manager can gain more accurate information than the competitor such
information can provide distinct advantages. For example, if an "upstream" firm (e.g., a firm producing
a raw material) has more information about supply conditions than any of the "downstream"
manufacturers that use these raw materials then it is possible that a manufacturer may want to improve
its information by vertically merging with the upstream raw material firm. This improved information
may allow the manufacturer to make improved production run decisions relative to its competitors. The
label that economists give to this (and a host of other scenarios) is to "reduce asymmetric information".
Here, the asymmetric information is that the upstream firm knows more about their supply conditions and
customer needs than downstream firms (Arrow, 1975). Conversely, the upstream firm may want to gain
information from the downstream firm in order to accelerate innovation and improve quality. For
example, a genetics firm may want to learn about the carcass performance of their product.
4. A related "asymmetric information" problem is that the manufacturer buying a raw material may not
know the cost of production. Clearly, this puts the buyer in a poor bargaining position. Thus, internal
production of some of the raw material ("tapered integration") can reduce the information disadvantage
of the manufacturer and improve their bargaining power with the raw materials supplier (Porter, 1980).
Of course, if it is revealed that the firm can produce the input at lower production costs than can any
input supplier they should shift to in-house production.
5. Vertical integration may be motivated by the desire to promote the use of a firm's primary product.
For example, Alcoa's forward integration into cookware promoted the use of its aluminum.
6. In cases where knowledge is not easily patentable, product development by end users may be more
readily transferred to different departments (subsidiaries) of a single firm than when the user and the
producer are linked by the market. Here the objective is not to eliminate asymmetric information hut
rather to maintain asymmetric information. Also, if the knowledge generated internally may he
applicable to a wide range of products, there may be an ability to appropriate the information internally.
For example, if Westinghouse invents a more efficient small motor it may be able to leverage this
distinctive competence across a broad range of appliances. The firm may "internalize externalities" (i.e.,
retain the gains of technological spillover across products and/or divisions). Keeping inntivations
proprietary may be a major reason why drug companies, such as Pfizer, are vertically integrated into
research and development. Honda's core products are internal combustion engines and power trains and
they do not outsource these critical items. Armour and Teece (1980) argue that vertical financial
ownership can: "enhance innovation through the sharing of technological information common to separate
stages of an industry, through facilitating the implementation of new technology when complex
interdependencies are involved, and through the formulation of more astute research objectives" (1980:
470). Armour and Teece (1980) demonstrate a strong and statistically significant relationship between
vertical financial ownership (measured by the number of stages among crude production, refining,
transportation, and marketing) and technological innovation in the U.S. petroleum industry.
7. Historically speaking, there may be a life-cycle effect to vertical integration. Adam Smith (1776)
noted that "the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market [i.e., demand]" and George Stigler
(1968: pp. 135-136) provides an elaboration:
Young industries are often strangers to the established economic system. They require new kinds
or qualities of materials and hence make their own; they must overcome technical problems in
the use of their products and cannot wait for potential users to overcome them; they must
persuade customers to abandon other commodities and find no specialized merchants to undertake
this task. These young industries must design their specialized equipment and often manufacture
it, and they must undertake to recruit (historically, often to import) skilled labor. When the
industry has attained a certain size and prospects, many of these tasks are sufficiently important
to be turned over to specialists. It becomes profitable for other firms to supply equipment and
raw materials, to undertake the marketing of the product and the utilization of by-products, and
even to train skilled labor. And, finally, when the industry begins to decline these subsidiary,
auxiliary, and complementary industries begin also to decline, and eventually the surviving firms
must begin to reappropriate functions which are no longer carried on at a sufficient rate to support
independent firms.
Thus, vertical de-integration is the predicted development in growing industries and internalization of
activities is predicted in embryonic and declining industries. Integration in the textile industry is held to
be consistent with the hypothesis. In general, however, the actual evidence of Adam Smith's "theorem"
is mixed for reasons that we will discuss in Section 4 below.
The slowness of open market mechanisms in responding to changes in consumers' food quality
demands for leanness, consistency in taste, etc., and the lack of producer responses have, in part, lead
to increased vertical coordination in broilers, eggs, turkeys and vegetables.
8. While the idea that vertical mergers are motivated by the assurance of supply in the case of backward
integration of the upstream firm is not new (Willoughby, 1901) its importance is almost surely high. In
fact, the manufacturer may decide to produce the input even when it experiences higher production costs.
The higher production costs may be an insurance payment in "thin markets' (i.e., when there are few
suppliers). Furthermore, in time, greater experience may bring down the production costs, and the
integration may lead to higher profitability.
9. Similar to the assurance of supply for backward integration, the supplier may forward integrate into
retail outlets to assure access to the market. Vertical contracts such as exclusive dealing contracts may
also be used.
10. The manufacturer may choose forward or backward integration to control the quality of services
to the customer or quality of critical inputs. For example, a grain processor may want some vertical
coordination with the farmer relating to their harvesting equipment. Similarly, Motorola involves their
suppliers in the review of specifications.
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Relatedly, vertical integration may be an adaptive response to a product differentiation strategy that
is driven by changing customer demand and/or technology supply conditions. For example, product
differentiation at the farm level (e.g., corn with high oil content, soybeans designed for specific
international markets) may lead to different quality control and monitoring costs for which new vertical
coordination organizational forms may evolve (Barry, Sonka and Lajili, 1992). Attempts to promote new
products may also require greater vertical coordination.
12. The coordination of more complex (interdependent) products may necessitate vertical
coordination. In the automobile industry, Monteverde and Teece (1982) found that the complex electrical
system of both Ford's cars and General Motor's cars were produced in-house. It may be highly desirable
to coordinate decision-making through internal, adaptive, and sequential processes. Schrader (1986)
argues that with advances in biotechnology, agricultural products may become more complex and require
greater vertical coordination.
13. Occasionally, such forward and backward integration might be motivated by the motive of
foreclosure of inputs. Famous cases of alleged foreclosure include Brown Shoe and Standard Oil. In
the Brown Shoe case the shoemaker's purchase of a chain of retail stores was held unlawful (Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962)). Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) was alleged to
have attempted backward integration to acquire a producer of potash. This backward integration was held
unlawful because it resulted in "foreclosure" of from 1 per cent to 2 per cent of the domestic production
of potash (United States v. Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), 253 F. Supp. 196 (1966))\ It is
doubtful that foreclosure of inputs was the primary motive of either company in these cases, however.
The case of U.S. cement manufacturers' acquisition of numerous ready-mix concrete companies also
raised fears of foreclosure which may have lead to a cycle of further vertical mergers. In other
circumstances, an increase in horizontal concentration at one stage of the value chain may induce vertical
mergers due to concerns of market foreclosure in thin markets.
14. Related to foreclosure, vertical mergers may on occasion be used by larger firms as a barrier to
entry to smaller firms. When entry into either of two separate stages of the value-added chain is already
difficult because of large capital requirements, combining successive stages will further raise entry
barriers because new entrants must enter two stages rather than one. This motive is most likely in
concentrated industries (Williamson, 1975).
15. Vertical merger may also help facilitate oligopolistic coordination. Adelman (1972) suggested that
where control of crude oil supplies remained highly concentrated, vertical mergers into refining enhanced
stability by making it more difficult for an oligopolist to plan secretly to increase market share. Since
there were few significant independent refiners, no company could increase its output of crude oil without
first building refineries and distribution systems which signaled their plans to competitors.
16. Vertical mergers may also be used as a vertical price squeeze. For example, the price of crude oil
may be raised and the price of gasoline lowered to such an extent that an independent refiner could not
operate. Often, however, these price squeezes are an outcome of price discrimination.
17. The price discrimination objective for vertical merger can be illustrated by the example of Alcoa
which faced both highly price-sensitive markets (such as cookware where several substitutes were
available) and price-insensitive markets (such as airplane producers where for a time there were few
substitutes) for aluminum sales. Clearly, Alcoa had a profit incentive to charge different prices in the
different markets. Besides antitrust issues, a more fundamental economic problem for Alcoa was the
arbitrage problem . Alcoa used vertical mergers into cookware to bypass this "reselling (arbitrage)
problem" and then charged higher prices in the price-insensitive markets (Perry, 1980).
^ We regard managers' pursuit of (monopoly) profits as legitimate if their actions are within the
"rules of the game" to use John Maynard Keynes' phrase. Nevertheless, within the realm of public policy
and the concern for consumer welfare we also think that there is a place for andtrust law.
18. Vertical integration may also be used by a firm to reduce uncertainty. For example, if firms must
make decisions concerning price and production before actual demand is realized then vertical integration
can be a way to transfer risk. Firms vertically merge to ensure a supply of inputs for their "high
probability" demand and purchase from upstream firms their "low probability" demand. Upstream firms
fulfill an insurance role for the downstream firms (Carlton, 1979). [Note that vertical integration does
not, of course, reduce fluctuations due to aggregate market demand]. Sexton (1986) argues that a
restricted membership co-op can satisfy its high probability raw product demand from members and
attempt to procure low probability demand from non-members thereby shifting risk. Also, farm debt in
the 1980s may have made the sharing of capital expenditures more imperative, and may have caused more
independent farmers to become involved in vertical coordination arrangements. For example, under
contract hog production, a producer usually owns the buildings and equipment whereas the contractor
owns the feed and livestock. Vertical coordination in the hog sector could release between 20% and 40%
of assets from a farmer's balance sheet. This release may provide profitable alternatives for reinvestment
of capital to higher yield uses (Featherstone and Sherrick, 1992).
19. A special type of uncertainty may be due to perishability of the product. For example, perishability
is a significant factor for commodities such as milk, fruits and vegetables and to a lesser extent meat
animals. Producer-"first-handler" integrated exchange arrangements are more common in perishable
commodities than storable commodities (Chandler, 1977; Sporleder, 1992). We suggest that the key
concept is the time factor in distribution . Analogously, while newspaper publishers generally own their
own presses (since the value of their information is rapidly perishable), book publishers are less vertically
integrated and do not own their own presses (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978).
20. If there is significant market power in several stages of the "value-added chain" from raw materials
to finished product then the cumulative effect of above-competitive pricing leads to an undesirably high
price for the consumer and a profit loss from the perspective of the vertical system. Here, a vertically
integrated firm can avoid the myopic chain of successive above-competitive pricing (Blair and
Kaserman, 1983).
21. Suppose a car manufacturer can use a mix of plastics which are competitively priced and a
specialized steel which is non-competitively priced. Clearly the manufacturer can choose to minimize
the use of the highly priced steel and substitute more plastics. Economists refer to this flexibility of input
mix as "variable-proportions technology" (Blair and Kaserman, 1983). That is, the manufacturer can
vary the proportion of inputs (in this case, plastics and steel). Given the "true" cost of plastics and steel
there may be a unique optimal steel-plastics combination that is not being realized due to the upstream
monopoly pricing by the steel producer. A vertical merger permits the integrated firm to achieve
efficiency without scale or input utilization distortion and as a first approximation these cost savings
accrue as additional profits to the integrated firm. In fact, if the profit-maximizing post-merger output
differs, the incremental gains to profit may be still larger.
22. An obvious motive for some vertical mergers has been tax considerations. For example, in the
early 1970s vertically integrated petroleum firms found it profitable to increase the price of crude relative
to the price of final products in order to shift as much of their reported earnings as possible to the raw
materials extraction stage, which enjoyed tax preferences associated with resource depletion (Bolch and
Damon, 1978). In both the United States and Europe, the integrated petroleum companies have tended
to show very low accounting profits in their refining and marketing operations, compensating with high
returns at the less heavily taxed crude oil stage. Moreover, the widespread adoption of franchises by oil
companies in the 1930s was strongly motivated by the desire to avoid chain store taxation, Social Security
obligations, and labor legislation. Multinational corporations may be organized, in part, to exploit
differential taxation. If tax rates are lower in a country where one stage of production takes place (e.g.,
raw material extraction) than in another country where some other stage of production is performed (e.g.,
fabrication), then the vertically integrated multinational firm may be able to reduce its overall tax burden
through the choice of an appropriate transfer price. Tax considerations can also push in the opposite
direction. In agriculture, Schrader (1986) notes that in the past. Production Credit Association and
Farmers Home Administration loans to farmers may have been on more favorable terms than were
available to a contracting firm.
23. Regulatory change may also stimulate change in vertical coordination structure. For example,
changes in food safety laws may significantly increase the monitoring costs facing food companies. As
a result, alternative forms of vertical coordination that minimize the costs of compliance with the new
laws may become necessary (Hobbs and Kerr, 1992).
24. Changes in information technology have changed the viability of vertical coordination strategies.
For example, Frito-Lay has contractual arrangements with producers for specific types of corn. The
processed commodity is tracked all the way through the market channel on a bag-by-bag basis (Streeter,
Sonka and Hudson, 1991).
25. While this paper focuses on efficiency, risk-sharing and market power motives to explain
organization form, it is undeniable that antitrust laws and the political arena, in general, can have a
major impact on the choice of organizational form. For example some forms of vertical contracts (e.g.,
resale price maintenance) may be the most efficient (cost minimizing) way to achieve a given objective
but the organizational form is per se illegal. Thus, a vertical merger may obtain. Babb (1992) notes that
a coalition of animal rights, family farm and environmental groups could be a powerful voice in the
selection of production-marketing systems. In this paper, antitrust laws, politics, and regulatory rules
will be considered outside the managers' area of control. Clearly, in practice the amount of resources
that firms and industry groups deploy to influence rules can be considerable. Or put differently, the
choice of organizational form may depend crucially on the social-legal environment.
26. A major objective for vertical coordination is the minimization of transaction costs (Williamson,
1975). These costs include drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding agreements. Further transaction costs
may occur after a deal is made. There may be haggling costs, arbitration and mediation costs, and
bonding costs of determining collateral and liquidated damages. Property right laws can clearly influence
transaction costs (Coase, 1988).
The cost minimization motive relates directly to the choice of organizational form which we
consider in section 4 after discussions of vertical contracting (section 2) and vertical financial ownership
(section 3) have been formally presented.
Section 2: Vertical Contracting
While the section above should convince a manager that there are many possible reasons for
vertical coordination that might be considered, a second pressing question is: what organizational form
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should be used? Section 2 provides a detailed discussion of vertical contracts. Section 3 then considers
the advantages and disadvantages of vertical financial ownership. Section 4 suggests criteria for
determining the choice of organizational form (e.g., vertical contracting or vertical financial ownership).
The analysis of vertical contracts may be described in principal-agent terms (Katz, 1989) where
vertical contracts are responses to goal incongruence, uncertainty, asymmetric information, opportunism
(ex ante adverse-selection, ex post moral hazard and hold-up problems),'* and the need to share risk.
Although vertical contract mechanisms will, for the most part, be discussed individually, we hasten to
add that in any particular case it is likely to be the bundle of vertical contractual mechanisms which
represents the solution to a vertical coordination problem. Or put differently, in various circumstances
there may be a package of vertical mechanisms that are sufficient to achieve joint-profit maximization.
For example, a bundle of vertical contractual mechanisms may be found in the provisions stipulated by
Purina Mills, Wayne Feeds, and other feed manufacturing franchises.
The following proposition captures the essential ideas of this section:
Proposition ft!'.
(a) A particular vertical contract mechanism can be used for different
objectives.
(b) A large number of dissimilar vertical contract mechanisms can be used
to achieve the same objective.
* Ex ante adverse selection (hidden information) can be seen in the used car market (sometimes
called the "market for lemons"; Akerlof, 1970). Over time the low quality autos (the lemons) will more
likely be brought to market than the high quality autos because the owners of the high quality autos will not
be able to receive the true value of the auto. Ex post moral hazard (hidden action) refers to cheating on
a contract or shirking in an employment relationship. Ex post hold-up problems are attempts by contracting
parties to renegotiate to achieve a greater share of the gains once commitments are already made. As one
might imagine the threat of hold-up may be quite severe in the case of perishable products. All three
problems suggest that vertical contracts must be sophisticated in order to align the incentives of the principal
(the payer) and the agent (the doer).
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Besides direct sales and the use of market price, there are a host of vertical contract mechanisms that may
be used to achieve coordination:
Direct Sales and Market Price. Clearly in a capitalist society we rely on the price system to
coordinate a tremendous number of transactions. That the price system coordinates economic
activity as if we were led by an "invisible hand" (Smith 1776) is truly a marvel. We will reserve
the term "price coordination" for this option. When we go beyond the price system itself to
coordinate activity we are in the range of vertical coordination.
1. Simple, short-term contracts. Concern for maintaining reputation, few transaction-specific
assets, and a well-developed body of common law allow farmland leases in the American Midwest
to contract based on a high degree of trust where only rudimentary details are spelled out (Allen
and Lueck, 1992).
2. Lump-sum entry fees. For example, in franchising vertical coordination, the franchisee may
pay the franchisor a lump-sum franchise fee. This fee can serve two purposes for the franchisor:
(1) "ex ante screening", that is, only the more qualified entrepreneurs will be willing to pay a
high entry fee; and (2) ex-post cooperation (a reduction in moral hazard), that is, the franchisee
having invested a lump-sum has a greater incentive to execute the details required by the
franchisor. For this fee, the franchisee typically receives training and other initial services, and
perhaps most importantly, use of the franchisor's trademark.
3. Royalties. For example, the manufacturer can impose a payment proportional to the number
of units sold downstream. Alternatively, die royalty fee might be 5% of gross sales, for example.
In certain cases, the royalty rate decreases as sales volume increases. In a franchise system,
royalties may be desired by the franchisee as well as the franchisor. If the franchisor obtained
no royalty from current sales then there would be no incentive for the franchisor to enforce
quality standards for the entire franchise system.
4. Profit-sharing arrangements. For example, sharecropping arrangements (share tenancy) may
be used in commodity production in order to achieve risk sharing and reduced transaction costs.
The similarity between sharecropping and franchising in terms of risk sharing and reduced
transaction cost objectives should be noted.
5. Resale price maintenance. Manufacturers sometimes set not only their own wholesale prices
but also the prices at which their products are offered for sale by dealers and distributors.
Minimum resale price maintenance occurs if, for example, Nintendo required its retailers to sell
its video game for $40. Maximum resale price maintenance occurs if, for example, the New
York Times required its home delivery distributors to sell the newspaper for no more than $4 per
week, {note: a vertically integrated firm could set its own price}. Minimum resale price
maintenance (RPM) can be used to illustrate our proposition 2(a) above:
(i) RPM may be used by a manufacturer to suppress retailer price competition (by a
retailer who might free-ride and not provide service) in order to induce retailers to
compete on non-price pre-sale service that the manufacturer desires (Telser, 1960).
(ii) RPM may be a way to eliminate "loss leaders" and achieve a quality signal by dealer
certification of product quality (Marvel and McCafferty, 1984). In some sense RPM is
a way for manufacturers to purchase quality or style certification from reputable dealers.
A quality signaling motive to achieve high quality image may help explain RPM for such
products as Levi-Strauss jeans, Florsheim shoes and London Fog raincoats.
(ill) Eliminating discounters may result in a relatively larger number of smaller outlets.
RPM may be a way to prevent price cutting that could undermine the manufacturer's
desired number and location of smaller retail outlets.
(iv) RPM may solve the myopic chain monopoly problem, discussed in point #20 in the
previous section. Maximum RPM can help achieve the profit maximizing price, rather
than the higher price that would result from above-competitive pricing at successive stages
in the vertical chain.
(v ) RPM may be a mechanism for a manufacturers' cartel. With RPM, if a manufacturer
cheats by lowering the wholesale price, resellers will be unable to pass the discounts
through to their customers without deviating from the maintained prices. Collusive
manufacturers can boycott resellers who will not maintain prices. Moreover, RPM may
be used to prevent countervailing buyer power from exerting a constraining influence on
monopoly pricing by the manufacturer.
(vii) RPM could also be a mechanism for a dealer cartel. The manufacturer is used
(vertically) to police the RPM and stabilize the retailers' horizontal collusion as in the case
of distilled spirits in the United States (Ornstein and Hanssens, 1987). Clearly, the
supplier must lack superior alternatives for distribution.
(viii) The use of resale price maintenance may also be used by manufacturers to obtain
shelf space as an alternative to slotting allowances (shelf space rental fees) (Shaffer,
1991). A full analysis should also address the question of why the dealers use their
collusive monopsony power to obtain a protected margin instead of lower prices from the
supplier(s).
6. Exclusive territories. A manufacturer may provide the dealer with a certain territory for the
dealer to control. For example, a local electronics store that sells a particular brand of television
is granted a guarantee that no other store within a two-mile radius will be allowed to sell that
brand of television. Other examples include: if General Motors agreed to allow only one GM
dealership in a city; a beer distributor limits sales to a specified geographic area; and local
bottlers are granted exclusive geographic territories in which to distribute products trademarked
by a small oligopoly of nationwide syrup producers. A second type of restraint is a customer
restriction . Under customer restrictions, certain classes of consumers are reserved for the
manufacturer's own sales force. A personal computer manufacturer, for example, might reserve
sales to Fortune 200 companies for the manufacturer's national sales force. Once again, a
number of objectives may induce the manufacturer to provide the retailer with an exclusive
territory: (i) The wider margin encourages the dealers to carry larger inventories and spend more
money on advertising and other promotional activities; (ii) Wider margins increases the dealers
cooperation with the manufacturer since the dealer wants to maintain its valued (discounted) future
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margins. This price premium of increasing the dealers' rents can then lower the monitoring costs
for the manufacturer; and (iii) The franchisor must be able to convince the franchisee that no
competing franchises will be established once the original franchisee has sunk nonrecoverable
start-up costs. Moreover, a franchisee would not be willing to pay the value of the monopoly
rents (via the franchise fee) that could be generated from owning the franchise because once he
purchased the franchise, the franchisor could then opportunistically sell another franchise (at a
lower price) to a competitor, which would destroy the franchisee's monopoly position.
7. Tying arrangements. Tying arrangements involve multi-product bundling. The manufacturer
may have an incentive to bundle product and services together to maintain the integrity of the
product. For example, tying may be used to control quality of complementary products to protect
the good will of the manufacturer- such as tying installation, equipment and maintenance of an
electronics system together. Tying has also been used to evade price controls. During the 1970s
when gasoline was under maximum price controls one station was alleged to have offered gasoline
at the controlled price to anyone who would purchase a (lucky?) rabbit's foot for $5. Tying
arrangements may also be used by manufacturers as a means to price discriminate (often based
on the intensity of use). For example, punch cards have been tied to computers, cans to can-
closing machinery, repair parts to automobiles, staples to stapling machines, toilet paper to
dispensers, mimeograph supplies to mimeograph machines, rivets to riveting machines, etc. In
agribusiness, the farm equipment manufacturers meter the use of tractors and other implements
by their sales of replacement parts. The tied good serves as a counting or metering device, the
tying arrangement results in streams of payments flowing from die users of the machine to its
seller. Those using the machine more intensively pay more; price discrimination is achieved.
For example, copying machine makers often refer to their toner as "black gold." Consider the
following tying arrangement in the motion picture industry (where such arrangements are often
referred to as "block booking"):
Movie: E.T. Plan 9 from outer space
Theater:
Family theater $1000 $700
Cult theater $600 $800
In this case, the cult theater values the movie "plan 9 from outer space" more than the movie
"E.T." ($800 > $600) while the family theater values "E.T." more ($1000 > $700). Here, a
single price of $600 for "E.T." and $700 for "Plan 9 from outer space" would yield a total of
$2600 for the seller. If the seller has a tying arrangement where each theater must pay $1400
for the two films together, then the seller can receive $2800. Economists refer to this as "getting
more of the consumer surplus." Associated Artists Productions negotiated a contract with one
television station for $118,800 in which the station had to take a bundle of 99 films. To get
Casablanca for example, the station had to take Tugboat Annie Sails Again.
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8. Exclusive dealing. Exclusive dealing is a contractual requirement by which retailers or
distributors promise a supplier that they will not handle the goods of competing producers^ For
example, an independent gasoline service station would buy all of its gasoline and motor oil
supplies from Mobil Company or a tire dealer sells only one manufacturer's brand. Exclusive
dealing arrangements may be motivated by: (i) the need to facilitate long-term planning; (ii) the
motive of foreclosure or raising rivals' costs; (iii) to elicit dealer services and energy for their
product; (iv) to provide the manufacturer with a property right to his promotional (e.g.,
advertising) investment (Marvel, 1982); and (v) to economize on marketing, inspection and
sorting costs (Gallick, 1984). For example, the inspection, sorting and grading required for tuna
are reduced through exclusive dealing arrangements. Processors simply buy the boatowner's
entire unsorted catch at a price reflecting average quality. If the processors tried to do this
without restricting the boatowner's ability to sell part of his catch elsewhere, boatowners would
have the incentive to sell the higher quality tuna to competing processors (at higher prices) and
thus increase the sorting and inspecting costs of marketing tuna. Exclusive dealing contracts
between boatowners and processors that require that a boat's entire catch be sold to a particular
processor prevent the duplicative inspection and sorting costs that would otherwise prevail. In
addition, the processors' equity interests in vessels serve to reduce the hold-up incentive of the
processor created by the exclusive dealing contracts. For those who doubt the importance of
transaction costs, the transaction costs savings in the tuna industry were roughly estimated in
excess of $12 million per year. Relatedly, Sunkist Growers, Inc. sorts fresh grade fruit (such
as oranges and lemons) into a limited number of grades, and growers are paid according to the
number of units harvested per grade, despite any remaining within-grade quality differences. The
packinghouse and its affiliated growers, however, must exclusively contract with Sunkist to
market all the fruit of the affiliated growers throughout the contract year. Additional grading,
inspection, and negotiation costs are thereby avoided by exclusively dealing on the basis of the
average within-grade quality over the contract period.
9. Requirements contracts. Under a requirements contract, the buyer agrees to purchase and
the seller agrees to supply the buyer's total requirements of particular goods during a specified
period of time. In U.S. automobile franchises, requirement contracts together with territorial
protection have historically been an integral part of manufacturer-dealer coordination. In
agribusiness, farmers in fruits and vegetables may contract with a cooperative to provide their
entire crop or crops. Objectives may be for (i) foreclosure; (ii) long-term planning for the buyer;
and (iii) to reduce selling expenditures for the seller, among others.
10. Vertical financial ownership. The manufacturer usually has the option of vertical
acquisition or merger where interfirm contractual relationships are replaced by intrafirm
employer-employee transactions. Inherent in the concept of vertical financial ownership is the
elimination of contractual or market exchanges and the substitution of internal transfers within
the boundaries of the firm via internal development or merger.
The upshot is that vertical contracts attempt to achieve the same goals as the vertically integrated
firm to: (1) maintain coordination to achieve economies of scope; (2) establish agreements to periodically
The well known Japanese "Keiretsu" system is quite similar to exclusive dealing contracts.
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revise complex products; (3) allocate risk-bearing; (4) coordinate information gathering to achieve
economies without jeopardizing commercial secrecy; (5) avoid substitution away from factors priced
above marginal costs; and (6) monitor and enforce contractual arrangements. In economic terms both
vertical contracts and the vertically integrated firm face a host of "principal-agent problems". Aligning
incentives and monitoring performance are at issue.
Proposition 2a suggests that vertical coordination mechanisms cannot be understood divorced from
the context in which they are placed^. At this point, proposition 2b should also be clear. For example,
to achieve the objective of price discrimination a manufacturer could choose (i) a tying arrangement, or
(ii) resale price maintenance and exclusive territories, or (iii) vertical financial ownership, or a host of
other mechanisms. If the manufacturer's objective is to increase pre-sale service of their product,
alternative vertical coordination devices are available (e.g., RPM, or exclusive territories, or vertical
financial ownership).
A fundamental idea is that in our economy there is competition among alternative
organizational forms. Although historical accident and governmental intervention can partially explain
the organizational forms we observe in the economy, our main case presumption is that economic actors
will choose the organizational form that achieves their desired objective at the lowest cost. Effective
product market competition and capital market competition lead to cost minimization.
In this section then we can describe a franchise contract in transaction cost minimization terms.
Consider the several standard clauses of the franchise contract of (1) management assistance to the
^ Without context it is impossible to know the objective of RPM, for example. Some of the
objectives are efficiency enhancing while other objectives are of possible antitrust concern. The only
defensible stance is that the legality of all types of vertical contracts (and vertical mergers) should be based
on a "rule-of-reason" (Phillips and Mahoney, 1985). Courts currently consider different types of vertical
contracts with different legal standards (e.g., RPM is per se illegal; some non-price restrictions follow a
rule-of-reason case approach). The courts seem fundamentally muddled in failing to recognize that
(efficiency and monopoly) objectives must be determined by looking at vertical contract mechanisms in
context. Courts' attempts to infer objectives from the form of vertical contract mechanisms are misplaced.
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franchisee; (2) control by franchisors of hours, prices, and conditions of plant; (3) franchisee royalty
payments; (4) termination clauses; and (5) investment in "hostages" (e.g., specific capital) to achieve ex
ante screening and ex post bonding effects (Williamson, 1985). These clauses may be viewed as a set
of cross-enforcing provisions that minimize the costs of monitoring and enforcing contracts. The key
point is to understand vertical contracting in its entirety . Thus, a franchisee's willingness to invest in
specific assets (a hostage), the price premium or rents received by the franchisee, and the monitoring
costs incurred by the franchisor are interrelated.
At this point we can see that the list of objectives discussed in the first two sections of this paper
suggests why vertical coordination is needed but does not provide much guidance on how to achieve
vertical coordination. That is, when should vertical contracts be chosen and when is vertical financial
ownership preferable? Section 3 considers the advantages and disadvantages of vertical financial
ownership, while section 4 considers the salient dimensions to consider in the choice of organizational
form.
Section 3: Vertical Financial Ownership: Advantages and Disadvantages.
The issue of whether to achieve vertical coordination objectives by vertical financial ownership
is part of a more general question concerning the "nature of the firm" (Coase, 1937). In the agribusiness
context, King (1992) describes the issue as determining the appropriate boundaries of the firm. What are
the advantages of the firm over contracting (or put differently, what are the disadvantages of contracting)?
A significant explanation for the existence of the firm (vertical financial ownership) is due to the
problem of bounded (limited) rationality of the contracting parties in an environment of uncertainty
that is complicated by the fact that some individuals may behave in an opportunistic manner that often
is problematic when there are small-numbers of bargaining alternatives (Williamson, 1975):
a) Given that contracting parties have bounded rationality and cannot think of all contingencies
in advance, contracts are necessarily incomplete. Contracting costs may be high if the parties
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incur the upfront cost of considering all the possible bridges they may come to, or alternatively,
suffer contractual litigation for a contingency that was not considered. The firm (i.e., vertical
financial ownership) may allow for adaptive, sequential decision-making . The tlrm will cross the
bridges (address the contingencies) when they come to them.
b) A complexity of parts in production may require direct supervision. The firm may provide
a structured environment for greater efficiency in coordinating the design, production, and
marketing of both the end product and its components as a single system. Thus rapid adaptation
(as well as secrecy of design) is maintained through vertical financial ownership.
c) The firm can also economize on bounded rationality by the use of common language and the
development of an emerging culture that promotes convergent expectations among contracting
members. The successful firm may achieve an informational processing advantage that improves
plan consistency in corporate, business and functional objectives. Moreover, in such a culture,
associational benefits accrue to team members. Quasi-moral concerns develop. The well-being
of team members matter. Cooperation is promoted and a sense of fairness obtains. Such
"intangibles" may provide the substantive worth of the firm.
d) Over time, the firm may also learn the skills of the workers and allocate labor more efficiently .
Also, the firm may appropriate some of the gains of tlrm-specific capital and "learning-by-doing
efficiencies" including tacit knowledge via organizational learning.
(e) The firm may mitigate costly haggling since the preemptive claims that may be achieved by
contractual bargaining have been replaced by a joint profit maximizing incentive structure that
can be more effectively implemented where the firm has advantages in both monitoring and
(internal) auditing respects relative to contracting parties. A firm has a legal right to audit its
divisions but no right to audit outside contractors. Asymmetric information is reduced within
the firm (relative to contracting) and opportunism is thus constrained.
(f) The firm may also achieve more effective cooperation as the result of more refined
compensation schemes based on such cooperation . Better conflict resolution mechanisms
including (limited) authority by fiat as well as mediation and arbitration are all preferable to
contractual litigation.
(g) The firm can economize on bounded rationality and attenuate opportunism by minimizing the
divergence of preferences of team members via selection, training, and socialization
. Due
sensitivity to the fact that this argument may also be used to rationalize the exclusion of marginal
groups in society as well as to promote an excess of unwarranted indoctrination within an
organization is noted.
(h) The firm may be the best solution for minimizing the inherent contractual trade-off between
optimal investment (where small numbers may make short-term contracts problematic) and
optimal sequential adaptation processes (where long-term contracting is problematic).
(i) The firm may minimize transaction costs (e.g., negotiation, sales, and distribution costs).
The contractual problems in selling information may be particularly severe.
15
In sum, when a firm moves from vertical contracting to vertical financial ownership: (1) incentives
change, (2) ownership changes, and (3) the ability to monitor and reward changes.
Limits of Vertical Financial Ownership. A host of potentially serious problems need to be considered
before exercising the option of vertical financial ownership (Harrigan, 1984; Williamson, 1985):
(a) The vertical business creates increasingly serious complexities in management which weaken
its efficiency. For example, manufacturing and marketing demand different managerial
requirements resulting in a cost penalty for those who do not remain focused on their core
competence in the value-chain. Also, the internal supplier may lack the experience and
connections that non-integrated external suppliers have access to.
(b) Inflexibility of operations - By putting more eggs into the same end-product basket, vertical
financial ownership increases the firm's dependence on a particular segment of economic demand.
This is especially critical when sunk cost investments increase exit barriers.
(c) Increased fixed (and sunk) overhead costs consume capital resources and reduce real options,
a potential problem that can be particularly damaging to smaller firms.
(d) Bureaucratic inefficiencies and dulled incentives may result when there is a lack of competitive
pressures on the costs of intermediate products resulting in undesirable slack in the system.
Internal procurement decisions may become more prone to politicizing and logrolling.
Inefficiencies may reduce the ability to respond to market, product, or technological changes,
locking the firm into outdated capital or obsolete processes.
(e) There may be diminishing returns to management and a loss of control that becomes critical
if an organization has an expansionary bias as a way to minimize internal conflict.
Communication distortion (both deliberate and unintentional) may increase as firm size expands.
(f) Capacity imbalance and excess capacity may result in production cost disadvantages for the
vertically integrated firm (due to contracting problems of achieving efficient scale).
(g) Psychological sunk costs as managers refuse to admit failure in certain segments of the value-
chain may inhibit desired vertical de-integration.
At this point, it seems beyond dispute that vertical contracts and vertical financial ownership have both
advantages and disadvantages for achieving vertical coordination. Section 4 suggests some criteria to
consider in the choice of organizational form.
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Section 4: The Choice of Organizational Form
Theoretical and empirical research suggests that there are several variables which should be
considered in determining the choice of vertical contracting or vertical financial ownership. This section
considers the following potentially critical variables: (1) frequency of transactions; (2) the number of
potential trading partners; (3) use of firm-specific assets; (4) demand uncertainty; (5) uncertainty
concerning the timing of the obsolescence of technologies; (6) technological interdependencies; (7) the
difficulty of monitoring inputs; and (8) the difficulties of measuring output.
Frequency . Vertical financial ownership involves significant setup and maintenance costs. As
transactions occur more frequently vertical financial ownership becomes more desirable since potential
losses from not integrating outweigh the overhead costs of vertical financial ownership.
Number of potential trading partners . When there are many potential trading partners for
buyers, there is a competitive environment which protects buyers since they have alternative sources if
contractual difficulties occur. However, if there are only a small number of (potentially collusive)
suppliers then vertical financial ownership may become necessary. The smaller number of growers per
processor in the case of turkeys (Knoeber, 1989) may partially explain vertical financial ownership.
Williamson (1985) also warns practitioners about the problem of "fundamental transformations". While
initial contracting conditions suggest a large number of potential contracting partners, over time there may
be "learning by doing" advantages that increase the efficiency of interaction with a small number of
suppliers. Thus, switching costs for a buyer may become high and contractual frictions become more
damaging.
Use of firm-specific assets . Williamson (1985) suggests that asset specificity is a major feature
of the small-numbers problem which can lead to the vertical financial ownership choice. Specific assets
may take the form of (a) human capital specificity; (b) site specificity; or (c) physical capital specificity.
Frank and Henderson (1992) provide empirical support that asset specificity plays a role in vertical
financial ownership patterns in the U.S. food industries.
(a) Human capital specificity. Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) found that human asset
specificity (e.g., workers knowledge of firm-specific product features) led to significantly greater forward
vertical integration in the electronic components industry. In fact, a review of the history of vertical
integration in the United States reveals that forward integration out of manufacturing into distribution is
much more common for durable products diat require specialized knowledge of product attributes, in
order effectively to sell and service an item, than it is for products which lack these features. Forward
integration at the turn of the century by companies such as Singer Sewing Machine. National Cash
Register, and McCormick Harvesters correspond with the human capital specificity argument (Chandler,
1977).
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(b) Site specificity. The costs of transporting feed and mature broilers, along with the
perishability (high storage costs) of live birds, have led growers and integrators (feed suppliers and
processors) such as Perdue, and Tyson to locate near one another. Their broiler houses constructed by
growers are relation-specific assets. Their value depends upon an ongoing supply relationship with the
local feed mill and processor. Such an investment creates a bond to assure grower performance. More
importantly, such investments induce self-selection by high-quality growers (much like an entry fee
discussed earlier). Also, the feed mills and processing facilities provided by integrators are relation-
specific assets because of their "site specificity" that protect a grower's investment from integrator
opportunism (Knoeber, 1989). Tournaments of (at least 10) contract growers are used to compensate
contract growers based on their relative performance in an environment of rapid technological change due
to genetic innovation and medical advances. A tournament provides a way to adapt cheaply to changing
productivity without renegotiating contracts. Tournaments difference out the effects of common shocks
(e.g., bad weather) while maintaining incentives for effort. Why do broilers use tournaments while
turkeys and eggs rely more on vertical financial ownership under similar conditions of uncertainty and
site specificity? Knoeber (1989) suggests that the key idea for the success of tournaments is that there
are a sufficient number of contestants. The number of producers per integrator is much higher for
broilers than for turkeys or eggs. In contradiction to Stigler's life-cycle hypothesis (discussed in section
2 above), if site-specific supply is significant, vertical financial ownership will continue. Generic demand
("extent of the market") has little bearing in this case. Industry growth in demand may not eliminate
small numbers if "learning by doing" (human capital specificity) economies are great.
(c) Physical capital specificity. In the automobile industry, for example, assemblers tend
to own all the specialized tools and equipment employed by their suppliers in fabricating parts for an
automobile company (Monteverde and Teece, 1982). Physical capital asset specificity is almost certainly
extensive in the petroleum industry where major petroleum refiners are highly integrated, commanding
extensive crude oil reserves, retlning facilities, and pipelines (highly immobile assets!) through which
crude oil and refined products are transported. High asset specificity makes opportunistic supplier
decisions particularly risky for the buyer. Due to potential "hold-up" problems in vertical contracting,
vertical financial ownership often obtains.
Demand uncertainty . The higher the demand uncertainty, the more incomplete a vertical
contract is likely to be. Walker and Weber (1984, 1987) found in their studies on the make or buy
decision for 60 relatively simple component parts associated with the initial assembly stage of an
automobile manufacturer (where each component was evaluated by a procurement committee within the
firm) that demand uncertainty was associated with vertical financial ownership in low competition vertical
supply markets. Demand uncertainty was measured by (i) the extent to which significant fluctuations are
expected in the daily or monthly volume requirement for the component and (ii) the extent to which
volume estimates for the component are expected to be uncertain.
Uncertain timing of the obsolescence of technology. Low technological uncertainty based on
a low uncertainty concerning the timing of the obsolescence of a particular technology leads to higher
investments in firm-specific assets and hence higher vertical financial ownership. Walker and Weber
(1984, 1987) measured this type of technological uncertainty by (i) The frequency of expected changes
in specifications for the component and (ii) The probability of future technological improvements of the
product. Consistent with this hypothesis high technological uncertainty with low specificity (high supplier
competition) decreases the likelihood of vertical integration.
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Technological interdependence and complexity
. A coordinated change in a highly
interdependent technological system requires recognition by those responsible for various parts of the
system. Sometimes the market is slow to adapt quickly, as Stigler (1968) noted. Second, there are
disclosure problems in market coordination for trading technological advances in knowledge. Information
is particularly hard to sell because if the seller reveals the knowledge to the buyer, the buyer gets the
knowledge for free. On the other hand, if the seller does not reveal information, the buyer may be
reluctant to purchase. Third, contractual coordination may lead to a dissipation of benefits as knowledge
diffuses rapidly to competitors. Fourth, organizing teams of workers to achieve complex, interdependent
technological systems in a timely manner may be difficult in contracting relationships. Given these four
problems, vertical financial ownership may be preferred. Ford and GM's in-house production of the
technologically interdependent electrical system of their car is illustrative (Monteverde and Teece, 1982).
Difficulty of monitoring inputs
. In some cases, observing input (effort) is a poor measure for
making rewards. For example, Eisenhardt's (1985) study of retail salespeople in 54 stores found that
service is a less programmable job because service is a highly abstract and variable commodity which is
difficult to monitor. Coordination by fiat and monitoring of behavior (i.e., vertical financial ownership)
decreases as more complex customer sales service is provided.
Difficulty of monitoring output
. Two types of problems have been identified in the academic
literature: (a) nonseparability problems and (b) quality measurement problems.
(a) nonseparability problems. Nonseparability problems are high when observing output
is a poor measure for making rewards. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) provide the example of the difficulty
of ascertaining individual productivity of two men loading items on a truck (team production) if only the
output is observed. Also, team sales of electronic components result in a difficulty of measuring an
individual salesperson's productivity. Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) found that this nonseparability
problem increased forward vertical integration at a statistically significant level in the electronic
components industry.
(b) quality measurement problems. While the quality of some goods can be easily
determined upon inspection ("search goods"), the quality of other goods can only be determined by
experiencing them. Barzel (1982) notes that the quality of an orange, for example, is determined in the
eating (e.g., whether the orange is juicy) and is thus an "experience good". These "experience goods"
may require a greater amount of control of inputs. At one time, you could go to the market to buy a fat
pig and go home again jigga-de jig. However, suppose now hog farmers produce hogs with subtle and
difficult to measure (leaner pork) quality variations determined by how the farmer fed the hog. The
carcass performance has been transformed from a "search good" to an "experience good". Vertical
financial ownership could allow the purchaser to control the farmer's behavior in order to more
economically estimate carcass performance.
These critical variables, should be considered in combination for determining the choice of
organizational form. For example, in the turkey industry there are: frequent transactions, a smaller
number of growers per processor, high site specificity (as growers and processors are located near one
another), demand uncertainty, technological interdependence between growers and processors for
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achieving high quality products, and conditions where the monitoring of inputs are effective (high task
programmability). Also, turkeys are an "experience good" where the processor must purchase the
grower's product before the quality of the turkeys are fully established. Each of these dimensions suggest
that vertical financial ownership would be a viable organizational form.
Section 5: Conclusions
Section 1 demonstrates that there are many possible objectives for vertical coordination.
Section 2 describes a variety of vertical contracting mechanisms to achieve these various objectives.
Section 3 considers the advantages and disadvantages of vertical financial ownership. Section 4 provides
critical dimensions to consider in the choice of organizational form. The fundamental idea for the
practitioner is that in changing market environments, successful decision makers are often involved in
f
a search for more efficient organizational forms (e.g., vertical contracts, franchising, equity joint
ventures, vertical financial ownership). This search process involves a comparative assessment of
efficiencies among imperfect organizational forms. Differenfial efficiency of one existing organizational
form relative to another can (for a time) be a source of competitive advantage.
This paper considers the choice of vertical contracting or vertical financial ownership^ Our third
proposition summarizes the efficiency argument:
Proposition 3 : Vertical financial ownership is more likely to be more efficient than vertical
contracting under the following set of conditions:
(a) There is a high frequency of transactions.
(b) There are only a small number of potential trading partners.
(c) A high level of asset specificity (human, site, physical capital) locks trading
partners into a small-numbers trading situation which may make contracting
hazardous due to potential haggling costs and "hold-up" problems.
^ A more refined theory is still needed for determining when equity joint ventures and franchising
arrangements are the more appropriate organizational form.
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(d) Higher demand uncertainty makes contracting more difficult.
(e) Low uncertainty about the timing of the obsolescence of specific assets will allow
greater investment in specific assets with greater vertical financial ownership.
(f) Higher interdependence and complexity of products to consumers often
necessitate vertical financial ownership.
(g) Higher task programmability allows for effective monitoring of inputs and favors
vertical financial ownership.
(h) High nonseparability problems necessitate that inputs be monitored in order to
determine individual productivity. Thus, vertical financial ownership is favored.
(i) A higher degree of difficulty in ascertaining quality of product by inspection
suggests that the monitoring of inputs is required. Once again, this favors vertical
financial ownership.
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